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1 ABSTRACT
Understanding the effectiveness of alternative approaches to water conservation is crucially
important for ensuring the security and reliability of water services for urban residents.
We analyze data from one of the longest-running “cash for grass” policies - the Southern
Nevada Water Authority’s Water Smart Landscapes program, where homeowners are paid
to replace grass with xeric landscaping. We use a twelve year long panel dataset of monthly
water consumption records for 300,000 households in Las Vegas, Nevada. Utilizing a panel
difference-in-differences approach, we estimate the average water savings per square meter
of turf removed. We find that participation in this program reduced the average treated
household’s consumption by 18 percent. We find no evidence that water savings degrade
as the landscape ages, or that water savings per unit area are influenced by the value of
the rebate. Depending on the assumed time horizon of benefits from turf removal, we
find that the WSL program cost the water authority about $1.62 per thousand gallons of
water saved, which compares favorably to alternative means of water conservation or supply
augmentation.
2 INTRODUCTION
Policymakers in many cities and municipal areas are increasingly faced with the harsh reality
of water scarcity. Drought declarations have become commonplace, with the 2014 Drought
State of Emergency in California serving as but one high-profile example. This scarcity
has been driven by a combination of reduced rainfall and increased demand due to rapid
population growth in arid regions such as the U.S. Southwest. Gaps between water supply
and demand were historically addressed by augmenting supply through large scale water
infrastructure projects, but now these projects are largely regarded as excessively costly. For
water utilities, the result has been an increasing focus on fostering water conservation among
their customers. Economists have frequently advocated for raising water delivery prices to
2
end users since they can allocate the burden of water rationing efficiently across users and
encourage customers to target their personal water conservation in its lowest-valued uses
first. However, raising prices can create undesirable distributional consequences and may be
politically unpopular. As a result, water utilities have tended to favor a range of non-price
policies such as watering restrictions, marketing campaigns, and subsidies for modifications
to indoor and outdoor water infrastructure (Olmstead & Stavins, 2009).
Conservation measures targeting outdoor landscaping have become especially popular,
and are often justified on the basis that outdoor water use has constituted 60 to 65% of
residential demand in arid areas over a long time period (Mayer & DeOreo, 1999; Mayer,
2016). Furthermore, consumers often are often poorly educated about their outdoor water
use (Attari, 2014), suggesting that there may be low hanging fruit for water conservation
with even small incentives and changes in customer awareness. California recently devoted
millions of dollars to replace turf with drought friendly landscapes (Goldenstein, 2015).
While the difference in watering requirements of mesic vs. xeric landscaping are well es-
tablished (Mayer, Lander, & Glenn, 2015) and short-run savings have been demonstrated
in a few cases (Sovocool, Morgan, & Bennett, 2006; Medina & Gumper, 2004) a number of
questions remain unanswered about turf-removal subsidy programs. For example, do these
programs produce long-term savings, or do they suffer from the offsetting behaviors of the
rebound effect exhibited for many energy efficiency interventions (Sorrell, Dimitropoulos, &
Sommerville, 2009; Gillingham, Kotchen, Rapson, & Wagner, 2013) and for the installation
of low-flow plumbing (Campbell, Johnson, & Larson, 2004) and day-of-week watering re-
strictions (Castledine, Moeltner, Price, & Stoddard, 2014)?1 Do they conserve water in a
cost-effective manner relative to other forms of conservation or supply augmentation?
To shed some light on these questions, we analyze data from one of the longest-running
“cash for grass” policies - the Southern Nevada Water Authority’s (SNWA) Water Smart
1Aside from offsetting behavior, other causes of falloff in program effectiveness may include leaks from
aging drip irrigation and the possibility for increased water demands of vegetation in the face of widespread
conversion to xeric landscaping through its effects on outdoor temperatures (Klaiber, Abbott, & Smith, in
press; Gober et al., 2012).
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Landscapes program (WSL). This program pays homeowners to replace their lawns with
xeric (desert) landscapes. Utilizing a panel difference-in-differences (DID) approach, we use
twelve years of monthly water customer billing data provided by the Las Vegas Valley Water
District combined with geocoded spatiotemporal data on program enrollment to estimate the
average water savings per square meter of turf removed. To provide a sense of the impact
of the program across the year, we estimate water savings separately for four seasons of
the year. We also investigate the long-run temporal profile of the program by investigating
whether there are discernible differences in water savings across earlier vs. later cohorts of
participants and by examining whether water savings attenuate over time. In order to assess
the validity of the DID research design we use an event study similar to that employed
by Davis, Fuchs, and Gertler (2014). This method allows us to verify that the changes
in WSL households’ water consumption coincide with their program participation, and to
demonstrate that there is no evidence of a contemporaneous consumption change for our
control group which may lead to spurious estimates of WSL treatment effects. Finally, we
estimate annualized water savings per dollar of subsidy spent and compare these costs to
estimates of the cost of conserving this water by other means.
3 BACKGROUND
3.1 Water Scarcity in Las Vegas
Las Vegas, located within Clark County Nevada, has been at the forefront of U.S. “Sun
Belt” development, with its MSA growing from approximately 850,000 residents in 1990
to nearly 2 million in 2010. An overwhelming amount of this growth occurred outside of
the historical core of the city, with residential land area in the city more than doubling
(Brelsford & Abbott, 2017). Over 90% of Clark County’s water supply comes from Lake
Mead on the Colorado River (SNWA, 2009). This dependence on a river whose waters are
fully allocated and in a multi-decadal drought (Castle et al., 2014), combined with Nevada’s
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Figure 1: Residential Parcels inside the study area, which is the urbanized parts of the Las Vegas
Valley Water district service area. Parcels are colored by the in which they were constructed.
status as a junior rights-holder under the Colorado River Compact, have heavily shaped the
development of Las Vegas’ water policy. The Southern Nevada Water Authority (SNWA) was
created in 1991 as a water “super agency” comprising five water districts, including the Las
Vegas Valley Water District (LVVWD) (which serves approximately three-quarters of Clark
County, including all unincorporated areas and the city of Las Vegas) and two sanitation
districts. This body was created in order to cooperatively manage water allocations across
its members as well as to coordinate supply augmentation and demand management efforts.
Beginning in the late 1990s, and accelerating with the declaration of a drought alert in 2004,
Las Vegas began implementing a range of policies, incentives and building code changes
aimed at curbing water use (Brelsford & Abbott, 2017). These ranged from rebates for
irrigation clocks and pool covers, restrictions on turf in new construction, increases in water
prices, and improvements in the ability to enforce and fine residents for conspicuous water
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waste, such as overspray of sprinklers onto sidewalks.
Many of the SNWA’s conservation efforts focused upon reducing outdoor water use. This
was driven in large part by the fact that Las Vegas receives return flow credits for any water
that is withdrawn and subsequently returned to Lake Mead. Most water used indoors is
ultimately treated and returned to Lake Mead such that it is not counted against the SNWA
allocation. Since a substantial portion of outdoor water use cannot be captured for reuse,
reductions in outdoor water use represent a much larger increase in effective supply than an
equivalent amount of indoor conservation. Perhaps the most well-known of SNWA’s efforts
at curbing outdoor water use was the Water Smart Landscapes program.
3.2 The Water Smart Landscapes Program
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Figure 2: Cumulative WSL conversion area in acres and the nominal WSL rebate at that time. We
group WSL participants into four cohort groups based on the nominal rebate price they received.
Cohort 1 includes households that participated before February 2003, Cohort 2 includes households
that participated between March 2003 and December 2006, Cohort 3 includes January to December
2007 conversions, and Cohort 4 includes households that participated after January 2008.
SNWA began the WSL program in 1996 as a small pilot program, and expanded it to
all customers in 1998. Beginning in mid-2000 the program took on its modern form by
issuing rebates to customers who converted their lawns to desert landscaping based upon
the size of the converted area. Fig. 2 shows the cumulative area of WSL conversions over
6
the program’s history, demonstrating how it grew from a relatively small-scale program to
a widespread and important aspect of SNWA’s water supply security plan after the 2004
drought declaration. The program paid residential and commercial landowners between
$0.50 and $2.00 per square foot of grass removed and replaced with xeric landscaping. SNWA
notes that typical landscape conversions cost about $15 per m2 ($1.40 per square foot in 2000
dollars), although higher end landscapes can cost substantially more (Sovocool et al., 2006;
SNWA, 2014). This means that for more recent WSL cohorts, the rebate incentive could
cover most of the cost of a typical conversion. There have been limits on the maximum rebate
available for residential consumers. A more detailed history of the WSL rebate structure
and limits is outlined by Brelsford (2014).
The process of WSL conversion consisted of an application followed by a site visit verifying
that the property was eligible in terms of meeting minimum conversion requirements and
ensuring that the turf was in fact alive and irrigated. Upon approval the landowner could
replace their lawn with xeric landscaping or artificial turf. After a final site visit verifying
the size of the conversion and that the post-conversion landscape met the requirement of
at least 50% living ground cover at maturity, the landowner received their payment. On
average 163 days (median of 142 days) passed between when a homeowner submitted their
application and the rebate check was issued, and 4.3% of conversions took more than a year
to complete.2
Aside from changes in the subsidy rates over time, the other major change in the program
related to restrictions on the length of time owners were required to maintain the conversion.
Initially there was no such requirement; however, in February 2003 property owners were
required to maintain the converted landscape for 5 years. In March 2004, this restrictive
covenant was extended to last for 10 years, or until the property was sold. Finally, in
June 2009, the program was changed again so that the xeric landscape must be maintained
in perpetuity, even after the property is sold. Despite these requirements, SNWA staff
2Email correspondence with SNWA staff members Kent Sovocool and Mitchell Morgan, November 7th,
2016
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members have no recollection of any systematic efforts to ensure long-term compliance for
converted landscapes.3 Altogether, homeowners in single-family residential properties in the
study area had converted about 834 acres of turf by the end of 2012, in comparison to about
35,300 acres of outdoor residential land (48,727 acres total, when including the footprint of
homes). There are also substantial residential areas of the city that were first built with xeric
landscaping, in part because of changing preferences, incentives for water smart construction,
and building code changes that limited use of turf.
Table 1: Water consumption and structural characteristics for homes that had a WSL conver-
sion and homes that did not. For WSL-participating homes, Matched homes, and Random
homes, the first row shows pre-treatment average consumption. For All Non-WSL homes,
average consumption is shown across the whole time series. The Random group shows
higher average consumption across all seasons than the the entire Non-WSL population does
because of Las Vegas’ citywide decline in average consumption across the timeseries.
WSL Matched Random All Non-WSL
Spring Consumption 18.0 15.9 13.0 12.1
Summer Consumption 32.4 27.0 20.7 18.9
Fall Consumption 25.0 21.6 17.0 15.5
Winter Consumption 12.8 12.1 10.3 9.8
Indoor Area (m2) 196.6 195.6 185.5 185.8
Lot Area (m2) 830.5 813.6 634.4 638.3
Rooms (No.) 6.7 6.7 6.5 6.5
Pool Ownership (%) 34.1 34.3 22.5 22.4
2012 Value ($) 55,238 54,899 51,080 51,233
Construction Year (med) 1992 1992 1997 1997
N 26,288 26,288 26,288 270,370
4 DATA
The dataset used in this analysis is a twelve year long panel dataset of individual monthly
household water consumption records in urban parts of the Las Vegas Valley Water District
Service Area. Figure 1 shows a map of all households included in the consumption dataset
3Conference call with SNWA staff members Kent Sovocool, Morgan Mitchell and Toby Bickmore, April
22nd, 2014
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colored by their construction year. Out of the 463,658 homes in the Clark County Tax Asses-
sors records and 39,939 households in the WSL conservation program records, 299,872 homes
(including 26,376 WSL participants) are in the study area and so have matched records of
residential water consumption. The 13,533 WSL participating households that are not in
the study area have similar physical characteristics to the participating homes that are in
the study area. Each record includes monthly water consumption and the home’s structural
characteristics as defined by the Clark County Assessors office in 2012. Structural character-
istics include indoor area, lot size, number of rooms, bathrooms, bedrooms, and plumbing
fixtures, as well as the presence or absence of a pool. The cleaned consumption dataset
excludes 10,196 (3.2%) homes because they do not have a matching assessors record and
thus cannot be geolocated, 30 of which participated in the WSL program. We also exclude
65 households because the recorded indoor characteristics for the home are physically im-
possible. Finally, we exclude 1,655 WSL participating households in the study area because
they have multiple recorded WSL conversions during the study period; we focus on homes
with single conversions for the sake of clean identification.
This leaves a panel dataset with 40,006,271 household/month observations. Consump-
tion records are further checked for consistency and validity in three different ways. First,
the first month of non-zero water use recorded for each home is excluded as these month’s
often show unusually high consumption. This excludes 299,872 observations. Second, nega-
tive consumption records and the two months prior to a negative record are excluded. This
excludes 4,347 observations based on negative values alone (some consecutive), and an ad-
ditional 6,037 based on the two months prior to a negative observation. It appears that this
negative billing strategy has been used as a billing correction for spuriously high consumption
in prior months. (The average within-household z score for these pre-negative consumption
records is 3.4, substantially higher than the dataset as a whole.) Finally, as a guard against
extreme outliers, an additional 55,274 observations are excluded because the within-panel z
score is greater than five.
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Although there were sometimes caps on the maximum conversion area that could be
rebated or the maximum rebate allowed, we always use the actual area of landscape that
was converted rather than the landscape area that was eligible for rebate, and the actual
rebate received. Finally, unless otherwise noted, the nominal dollar values for water bills,
water prices, rebate amounts, and any other payments have been deflated to year 2000
dollars.
4.1 Seasonality
To provide insight into the temporal footprint of water savings from WSL, we avoid pooling
water consumption across distinct seasons of the year into a single regression in favor of
estimating distinct regressions for each of four intra-annual seasons, where household water
use within each season is averaged across all months within that season. This approach has
the advantage of allowing for more flexibility of control than is typically observed in pooled
analyses. This approach allows complete independence between estimates of water savings
for different seasons while allowing direct comparisons of the different seasons’ regressions.
Our definition of seasons is informed by pooling months with similar water use patterns in
Las Vegas’ arid desert climate. Spring consumption is composed of the average of March and
April consumption. Summer is the months of May, June, July and August; and September
and October are averaged as fall consumption. Finally, November, December, January, and
February make up the winter season. Since our winter season straddles calendar years, we
define the water year as running from March to February, where January and February of a
given calendar year are included in the previous water year. That is, the winter 2004 season’s
consumption is composed of average consumption from November and December 2004, and
January and February 2005. Fig. 3 shows average consumption by season and by month for
our complete dataset.
Our seasonally-averaged panel dataset consists of about 3.6 million observations across
299,872 households, where 362,849 observations (and 341 households) are excluded based
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on the criteria described above. A seasons record is excluded if any one of the monthly
records within a season contain flagged data. There are 192,654 geolocated households with
consumption data in 2000. This increases to 297,289 households in 2012 due to Las Vegas’
significant population growth and new construction over the intervening years.
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Figure 3: Average Water Consumption by Month and Season, for WSL participating households
and non-participating households. Note that WSL participating households consume significantly
more water than non-participating households, especially in the summer. WSL participant data is
shown for pre-conversion consumption only.
4.2 Defining Treatment and Control Groups
For each seasonal regression, the treatment group consists of all households which partici-
pated in the WSL program between 2000 and 2012 such that landscape conversion occurred
before the end of that season in 2012. This provides at least one post-conversion datapoint
for each household in the treatment group.
Importantly, households that participated in the WSL program were not generally repre-
sentative of typical Las Vegas households. The most obvious difference, highlighted in Fig.
3, is that pre-treatment water consumption for WSL households was significantly higher
than for the typical household, especially in the summer. WSL participating homes also
had different structural characteristics (see Tab. 1): they are older, more valuable, and have
larger lot sizes. WSL participating homes also are typically somewhat larger along a variety
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of indoor dimensions, which is contrary to the overall tendency for older homes to be smaller
than newer homes.
Our panel DID estimation approach fundamentally relies upon the assumption that the
counterfactual water use by WSL homes after treatment is adequately imputed from homes
that are not yet treated - after controlling for time-invariant differences between these treated
and control homes and any shared trends. The substantial differences between WSL and non-
WSL homes suggests this “common trends” assumption may be questionable. Therefore, we
follow Ferraro and Miranda (2014, 2017) by matching each treatment household with a non-
participating household that has a valid consumption record in the year prior to the treatment
home’s WSL conversion and that has similar location and infrastructure characteristics. By
selecting a control group that is as similar as possible based on available pre-treatment
characteristics that may influence household water consumption, we seek to control for factors
that may cause differential trends in residential water consumption between WSL and non-
WSL homes.
The control group consists of an equal number of households which did not partici-
pate in the WSL program before 2012. The control household selected to match a given
treatment household is the consumption record of a home with the most closely match-
ing physical infrastructure characteristics from among all homes in the same block group.
Control homes are matched on block group (exact), vintage (date) of construction (nearly
exact4), and the normalized minimum distance for indoor area and lot size. To find the min-
imum normalized distance we normalize lot size and indoor area by their respective standard
deviations in the WSL population, and calculate the individual z-scores for treatment and
candidate control homes. Then, the distance metric is calculated using the Euclidean norm:
4Because not all treatment homes have valid consumption data in all seasons of a given year, there are
small differences in the number of matching control homes in each season. For all but 261 homes there is an
exact match for homes of the same vintage in the same block group. For the homes for which there is not an
exact match, 187 find a match within 1 year, 72 between 2 and 4 years, and twelve homes with differences
of vintage beyond 4 years. The homes without close matches are all pre-2000 homes, matched with other
pre-2000 homes. Our results do not change significantly when homes with a poor match on vintage are
excluded.
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√
(ztlot − zclot)2 + (ztindoor − zcindoor)2. Some control households are the best available match for
multiple treatment households; these households are included multiple times in the control
dataset. Table 1 shows that the matched homes are substantially more similar in char-
acteristics that are known to influence water use as well as in pre-treatment consumption
levels.
5 ESTIMATION APPROACH
5.1 Event Study
To examine the plausibility of the identifying assumptions that underlie our use of the
difference-in-differences estimator, we first estimate season-specific event studies of the form
shown in Eq. 1 using our balanced sample of WSL treated homes and matched control
homes.
cit = αbWSL(i) +
k=11∑
k=−11
βk1[τit = k]it +
k=11∑
k=−11
δkWSLi · 1[τit = k]it + γt + it (1)
where cit is average monthly water consumption for household i in year t over the focal season.
For treated homes, event year τit = 0 is defined as the first consumption season in which the
effects of a WSL conversion are likely to be experienced. Specifically, a treatment household
is assigned τit = 0 in the first season in which a completed WSL conversion is approved
by SNWA, and for each of the three subsequent seasons (i.e. the first year of treatment).
For example, in a household with a WSL conversion that was finalized in September 2003,
τit = 0 for fall and winter 2003, and spring and summer 2004. In the case of the control
properties this time index is set identically to the treatment home to which it is matched.
Shared absolute time trends across WSL participating homes and their matched controls are
captured by water year fixed effects γt.
It is necessary to omit one relative time period as the base category that is absorbed
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into the model fixed effects. We omit period τit = −1. The result is that the βk coefficients
are interpreted as changes in seasonal water consumption relative to the year prior to the
landscape change for the matched control group. We also omit τit = −1 for the WSL-
participant homes so that the δk coefficients reflect deviations in the gap in seasonal water
consumption between WSL and non-WSL homes relative to the average wedge in the pre-
conversion year (captured in the model fixed effects). The model is estimated using fixed
effects αbWSL(i) denominated at the Census block-group b and by WSL treatment status
(i.e. WSLi = 0, 1) level to control for omitted heterogeneity across space and the treatment
and control groups.5 Cluster-robust standard errors are used with clusters defined at the
block-group level.
The event study output is useful in several ways. First, it enables us to examine the
temporal profile of the δk coefficients to test whether the parallel trends assumption between
the treatment and control observations is justified on the basis of the pre-treatment data.
Second, the δk reveal the temporal profile of impacts to the treatment group in the time
period around WSL conversion - allowing us to assess whether the timing is sensible in light
of what is known about the WSL program. Finally, by examining the βk coefficients for
the matched controls and comparing them to the δk, we can examine whether there are
differential trends between the treated and control groups in the pre- and post-treatment
periods that are not adequately captured by the water year fixed effects γt. The βk coefficients
also allow us to verify that any treatment effect identified at τit = 0 is driven by the treatment
group itself and not an unspecified shock to the water use of the control homes.
5.2 Baseline Models of WSL Effectiveness
We focus our analysis on the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) associated with
WSL participation in terms of water savings per area of turf removed in gal/m2. The focus
5It is not possible to estimate (1) using parcel fixed effects due to the inability to simultaneously identify
distinct relative time fixed effects for both treatment and control groups and the absolute time fixed effects
using within variation alone (Borusyak & Jaravel, 2016).
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on a mean areal treatment effect, as opposed to a binary indicator of WSL participation,
provides a transparent unit of account for WSL effectiveness despite temporal and cross-
sectional heterogeneity in the amount of turf removed. It also provides a natural metric of
comparison since WSL subsidies are denominated by area.
Prior to presenting our DID specification based upon the available observational data,
it is useful to consider the measures of program effectiveness of potential interest to water
managers and how these relate to the outcomes of idealized experiments. Following Bennear,
Lee, and Taylor (2013) we consider two cases. The first, denominated ATTINSTALL, is the
ATT of a m2 of turf removal and landscape replacement (i.e. landscape transformation) under
WSL among those that participated in the program. This can be envisioned as the outcome
of a DID conducted before and after randomized assignment of eventual WSL participants to
a treatment group that undergoes the landscape transformation and a control group whose
landscaping remains unchanged (Bennear et al., 2013). The treatment in this case is the
landscape change itself.
An alternative measure of effectiveness, denominated ATTSUBSIDY is the ATT of having
access to WSL subsidy policy (along with the bundled technical advice, certified installers,
etc.). This could be estimated using a DID of outcomes from an experiment with randomized
assignment of households with WSL-eligible yards to a treatment pool with subsidies avail-
able and a control pool without these subsidies. An important distinction between these two
measures is that the availability of the subsidy need not lead to landscape transformation -
both treatment and control households may choose to alter their landscaping as they see fit.
We are unable to directly estimate either ATTINSTALL or ATTSUBSIDY using our data. We
cannot estimate ATTINSTALL because we lack reliable information on the landscape changes
of non-participants in WSL and therefore cannot guarantee that our control group held their
landscaping configuration constant over the study period.6 Furthermore, we cannot estimate
6SNWA does collect limited data on vegetation coverage at the parcel level from remotely sensed imagery.
There are substantial technical challenges to inferring vegetation area estimates in an urban environment
from remotely sensed imagery. These include factors that occlude the image such as clouds or smog, and
also trees with large canopies that prevent overhead observation of the ground cover (Brelsford & Shepherd,
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ATTSUBSIDY because the subsidy was made available to all eligible households, and we cannot
be certain that the adoption rate of water-saving measures (including landscape changes)
for any control group we construct will be comparable to that observed absent the subsidy.
Instead, our data allow us to estimate the ATT of WSL participation itself, ATTWSL, where
both the treatment and control groups experience the same policy environment but the
treatment group is distinguished by the fact that they enroll in the WSL program.
Bennear et al. (2013) argue in the context of a subsidy program for high-efficiency toilets
that ATT SUBSIDY ≤ ATTWSL ≤ ATT INSTALL (where the measures are framed in terms of
absolute values). Parallel logic applies here. ATTWSL is bounded from above by ATTINSTALL
since the control group for the latter holds landscape constant, whereas it is possible that
some individuals in the control group for ATTWSL adopted water saving landscaping without
receiving subsidization. It is also likely that ATTWSL ≥ ATT SUBSIDY for the reason that
treated individuals in the former case all undergo a landscape transformation, while in the
latter case those treated with the option of subsidized landscape replacement may choose
not to alter their landscape at all.
We expect that ATTWSL is a close approximation of ATTINSTALL for the reason that the
WSL program was aggressively marketed over much of its history and the subsidies under
WSL were substantial, covering a substantial portion of the cost of conversion. These factors
suggest that the control group for ATTWSL should consist primarily of households that chose
not to engage in large-scale turf replacement in their yards.
To develop a baseline estimate of the ATT of WSL participation, ATTWSL, we estimate
the following regression separately for each of the four previously defined seasons:
cit = αi + γt + βait + it (2)
where cit is average monthly water consumption (in gallons) over the focal season in year
t, and ait is the WSL conversion area (in m
2) for each home/year combination. αi is a
2014). Thus, while we have used vegetation data to check the results, we do not use it as a primary variable.
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parcel-level fixed effect reflecting time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in water use across
households which may be correlated with an individual’s decision to enroll in WSL. The WSL
area, ait, estimate is proportionally adjusted in any season in which a WSL conversion occurs
mid-season. For example, if a WSL conversion was in place for only two of the four months
in a given season, the WSL area in that season is adjusted to half of it’s true value.7
We estimate Eq. 2 using the fixed effects (within) estimator. In order to address prob-
lems of serial autocorrelation in individual water consumption (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mul-
lainathan, 2004) as well as spatial correlation in water consumption among neighbors and
heteroskedasticity, we report cluster-robust standard errors (Cameron & Miller, 2015), with
clusters defined at the US Census block group level.
5.3 Durability and Cohort Effects
To go beyond the average effects estimated in Eq. 2 we test the hypothesis that water savings
associated with WSL programs decline as the landscape ages. This could be driven by
substitution toward other water-intensive uses (e.g., greater indoor water usage) in response
to reduced water bills from outdoor watering, increased water needs of maturing vegetation,
or gradual degradation of irrigation infrastructure. A simple test of these possibilities can
be constructed using the following regression:
cit = αi + γt + β0ait + β1aityit + it (3)
where ait is the landscaping area for household i in time t as in Eq. 2 that has been converted
under the WSL program, and yit is the age, in years, of the WSL conversion. Results where
landscape-age dummy variables instead of a single slope are used to estimate the effect of
the age of the WSL landscape on consumption support the linear approximation used here.8
7Alternative approaches, including dropping observations where mid-season conversions occurred yielded
very similar results.
8The WSL conversion age is defined as zero for all household/year combinations before the WSL conver-
sion occurs (rather than as a negative number) and for households which do not ever participate in the WSL
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One factor that could bias our estimates of the durability of WSL water savings is the
potential for heterogeneous ATT estimates across different phases of WSL (see Fig. 2). This
potential bias occurs because our measurements of the savings of WSL-converted landscapes
at different ages ultimately reflect the proportions of different WSL cohorts in each age.
Because of the unbalanced weightings of the cohorts across different age groups, if there are
heterogeneous treatment effects across cohorts, their effects may be absorbed in the estimates
of the landscape age effect if cohort-specific effects are not controlled for. For example, β1 in
Eq. 3 may suggest a significant attrition of water savings over time if, for example, the late
adopters under WSL, which would be disproportionately young landscapes in our dataset,
had higher water savings - even if water savings for individual cohorts are permanent.
In order to simultaneously test for the existence of both duarability and cohort effects, we
augment Eq. 3 with cohort-specific estimates of WSL area at age zero, while still maintaining
the interaction of age and WSL conversion area:
cit = αi + γt + β0ait +
3∑
j=1
βjdjiait + β4aityit + it (4)
where dji is is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when household i is in cohort j and 0
otherwise. The cohorts are defined in Fig. 2, and coincide with changes in the marginal
rebate value. We use the most recent cohort group (group 4, conversions occurring after
2008) as the base level, represented in β0. Then, βj for j ∈ [1, 3] can be interpreted as
the differential effectiveness for cohort j in comparison to the base group. Finally, β4 is the
estimate of any effects of age on the permanence of WSL water savings, after controlling for
heterogeneity across participation cohorts.
program. The definition has no practical importance because in that case, ait is also equal to zero, and so
the β0 terms drop out.
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5.4 Economic Analysis
We explore the economic case for the WSL program from both public and private perspec-
tives. From the public perspective, we consider the cost-effectiveness of WSL in terms of the
water savings induced per dollar spent. We focus on cost effectiveness rather than employ-
ing a full-fledged benefit cost analysis due to the difficulties of estimating the social cost of
water for Las Vegas. Furthermore, for much of the period of our analysis Las Vegas has been
compelled by drought-induced scarcity to find immediate means to enhance return flows to
Lake Mead. Therefore cost-effectiveness seems appropriate for the decision context.
From a private perspective, we estimate the annualized benefits to residents from WSL
in terms of lower water bills and compare the stream of these benefits to the costs associated
with the landscape conversion. We use this comparison to examine the strength of private
incentives for turf removal in the absence of subsidization - providing evidence for whether
WSL primarily rewarded landscape conversions that were likely to have occurred even in the
absence of the incentive vs. inducing conversions that would not otherwise have occurred
(i.e., additionality).
5.4.1 Cost-effectiveness
In order to provide a consistent and interpretable estimate of the water savings that the WSL
rebate payments generated, we need to define a projected lifespan for the associated water
savings and also develop a temporally consistent method of comparing the water savings to
the rebate payments. WSL rebates are given as an upfront payment for water savings that
accrue over a long period of time. In order to resolve these temporal scales, we calculate the
annuitized cost of providing the subsidy - effectively the ongoing monthly cost of the debt
associated with raising this one-time rebate payment, hereafter referred to as the annuitized
subsidy payment, Pit.
9
9While SNWA paid WSL rebates out of its regular operating budget, they did issue bonds over our study
period and therefore we consider the opportunity cost of budgetary resources to be defined by the cost of
capital.
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We must also consider that the water savings from WSL should not be attributed to a
parcel indefinitely; eventually many homeowners may have converted to water-saving land-
scaping without subsidization. Furthermore, in the absence of incentive-based programs like
WSL, more draconian emergency policy measures may have been necessary to achieve wa-
ter conservation goals, inducing otherwise hesitant homeowners to install a xeric landscape.
Therefore, the water savings of WSL (and hence the annuitized costs of securing them)
should be calculated over the expected term until the landscape would have transitioned to
xeric cover in the absence of the subsidy. There is no defensible single estimate of this term,
and so we consider durations of 5, 10, 20, and 40 years. To calculate the annuitized cost we
utilize the real cost of capital for the SNWA as reflected in the coupon rates of municipal
bonds issued by SNWA and Las Vegas in the mid-2000s.10
Using the annuitized subsidy payment, we estimate panel DID models analogous to Eq.
2:
cit = αi + γt + βPit + it (5)
Thus, β can be interpreted as the marginal monthly water savings associated with an ad-
ditional monthly dollar spent on WSL rebates. The longevity of the WSL program as well
as heterogeneity in subsidy payments and water savings across cohorts suggest that the cost
effectiveness of WSL has likely varied over time. Thus, we also estimate a model analogous
to Eq. 4:
cit = αi + γt + β0Pit +
3∑
j=1
βjdjiPit + β4Pityit + it. (6)
10Nominal rates on municipal bonds issues by SNWA and Las Vegas averaged approximately 5% in the
mid-2000s. The annual real cost of capital is 2.36% after adjusting for a mean inflation rate of 2.58%. The
equation used to calculate the annuitized subsidy payment is Pit =
r·Li
1−(1+r)−12n , where r is the monthly real
cost of capital, n is the term length (in years), and Li is the lump sum subsidy payment.
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5.4.2 Private Benefits
In order to estimate the private benefits households receive from participating in the WSL
program in the form of reduced water bills, we estimate seasonal regressions of the form
shown in Eq. 2, where the dependent variable, mean seasonal consumption, is replaced with
the mean seasonal water bill.
Bit = αi + γt + βait + it (7)
where Bit is the monthly water bill for household it in deflated (2000) dollars. The β
coefficient from this regression provides estimates of the average monthly reduction in the
water bill in each season per m2 of turf removed. By comparing these estimated water
savings to the typical average cost per m2 of removing turf and re-landscaping, we are able
to assess whether investing in WSL-style landscapes is economically sensible from a private
perspective in the absence of subsidies and for reasonable discount rates.11
6 RESULTS
As a whole, we find clear evidence that the savings generated by the WSL program are con-
sistent with (though somewhat smaller) than previous engineering estimates by Sovocool et
al. (2006) and previously published estimates relying on neighborhood average consumption
rather than household consumption (Brelsford & Abbott, 2017).
6.1 Event Study
Fig. 4 shows the βk coefficients for k ∈ [−11, 11] for the matched control group in each
season. The lack of significant pre-treatment trends for the control group suggests that
11We do not consider whether there is any differential positive or negative amenity value to homeowners
from the landscape itself. This could be assessed using hedonic price models; however, any amenity value
must be considered apart from any capitalized water savings (or potential increases in energy bills) from the
xeric landscaping. Klaiber et al. (in press) find evidence in Phoenix, AZ that mesic landscapes have a higher
implicit value to homeowners than xeric landscapes, even after controlling for neighborhood microclimate.
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baseline trends are well accounted for through the use of the γt fixed effects. Furthermore,
there is no evidence of any shock to the matched control group coinciding with the timing
of WSL, with β0 ≈ 0 in all seasons. This suggests that any effect recovered by the DID
estimator based upon water use patterns in the period immediately after WSL adoption
will be linked to changes in the water use of WSL homes. However there is a relatively
mild downward trend in water use among the controls in the post-treatment period, even
after controlling for shared absolute time trends between WSL and non-WSL homes. This
suggests a potential need to control for differential trends in the DID model (Davis et al.,
2014).
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Figure 4: Event Study results by season for the control group of households that did not participate
in the WSL program and are matched on block group, home vintage, lot size and indoor area.
Fig. 5 shows the δk coefficients for the treatment group in each season - the wedge
between the mean water conservation of treatment and control groups relative to its value in
the year before WSL conversion (τ = −1), where this differential is normalized to zero. The
fairly flat pattern of the estimates up to two years prior to WSL installation shows that the
difference in water useage between treated and non-treated homes did not change with time
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prior to the WSL conversion - supporting the common trends assumption underlying the
DID estimate. All of the reductions in water use for treated households occurred between
τ = −3 and τ = 0. These differences stop accumulating once the landscape has been fully
installed, but begin to appear a couple of years prior to the final WSL inspection. In spring,
summer and fall, we see that 5 to 15 percent of the decline in water use relative to the
control group occurs between two and three years prior to conversion approval; 30 to 40
percent occurs between one and two years prior to final approval; and 45 to 65 percent of
the total declines occur in the year prior to conversion. After the sharp drop in water use
WSL homes show a remarkably flat and persistent effect, with no notable post-treatment
trend relative to the βks shared with the control group.
The reasons for the anticipatory declines in water use prior to final WSL conversion
are not observable from the data. However, a significant portion of the gap may be driven
by the interval between the timing of physical landscape replacement and measured final
approval. Our dataset only includes the date on which a household’s WSL conversion was
formally approved by SNWA. We do not have any household level data on when the actual
landscape change was implemented, even though we were able to obtain some aggregate
data on the time elapsed between when a potential participant first contacted SNWA about
participating, and the final approval date. Based on the terms of the WSL program, the
actual landscape change must have occurred between the time the participant first contacted
SNWA and the approval date that we record in our dataset.
Recall that we define τ = 0 to be the first year in which the landscape has been approved
by SNWA, and thus we can be certain that the WSL landscape had been fully installed.
Because of the annual structure of our dataset, a converted landscape may have been ap-
proved up to twelve months prior to the end of the season in which τ = 0. Summary
data provided by SNWA show a median gap of 4.75 months between the initiation of the
conversion process and final approval, with four percent of households taking longer than
a year. To give a rough sense of how these data structures combine with the gap between
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landscape change and approval (and consequently the lag between landscape change and
when we define τ = 0), we consider the share of households that could have been living
with a converted landscape when we define τ = −1. If all conversions had a 4.75 month
gap between landscape change and SNWA approval and conversions were evenly distributed
throughout the calendar year, then nearly 40% of treated households may have been living
with a recently installed xeric landscape when τ = −1 and so their water consumption in
this time also reflects the changed landscape. This suggests that a substantial portion of
the pre-treatment declines that we observe are attributable to this lag between landscape
change and approval. For this reason, we exclude τ = −1 from the main dataset used for
our DID models except where otherwise noted.
An alternative reason for the anticipatory declines in water use could be reductions in
outdoor water use in anticipation of turf removal. However, SNWA requires that a lawn be
alive at the time of it’s removal for the conversion to eligible for a rebate, so withholding
water from a landscape entirely is not likely. Nevertheless, homeowners could partially reduce
water consumption in anticipation of the landscape change. Alternatively, some homeowners
may have made other investments in water efficient appliances or fixtures or adopted water-
conserving behaviors in advance of their WSL installation. To the extent that WSL-adopters
were more likely to make these investments relative to control households, they may be a
source of upward bias in estimated water savings from WSL. However, if most of the early
reductions in water use represent anticipatory reductions in water use ultimately tied to
WSL, then the estimation strategy presented in Eq. 2 may understate the effects of WSL
due to some reductions in water use occurring before the measured treatment date. We are
unable to specifically differentiate these alternative hypotheses from our data, but examine
the sensitivity of our estimates to alternative assumptions below.
Broadly speaking, the magnitude of the estimated WSL-induced reductions in water use
across seasons is consistent with expectations from seasonal differences in water consumption
and vegetative water needs. In the spring, we observe a drop in consumption of about 3,980
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Figure 5: Event Study Results by season for WSL Participants.
gallons/month, summer 8,980, fall 5,680, and in the winter, a decline of 1,570 gallons/month.
Given that the average size of a WSL conversion is 111 m2, this suggests a reduction in
consumption of 36, 81, 51, and 14 gallons/month per converted m2 in the four seasons.
6.2 Baseline Estimation
Table 2 displays the β coefficients and summary statistics from estimating Eq. 2, where each
column consolidates the results from four seasonal regressions. To assess the robustness of
our results, we estimate Eq. 2 using a variety of alternative conceptions of the appropriate
control group and model specification. Models 1-3 all estimate Eq. 2 exactly as specified
but vary the definition of the control group used to estimate the underlying counterfactual
of water use in the absence of WSL adoption. Model 1 randomly matches the water use
history of each treated parcel with that of a parcel that never participated in the WSL
program. Model 2 forgoes the use of a separate WSL-untreated control group altogether,
instead utilizing the within-panel variation in the timing of WSL adoption among eventual
adopters to identify β. Model 3 utilizes the matched control group based on block group
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and pre-treatment infrastructure characteristics.
Table 2: Regression results for Models 1-5.
1 2 3 4 5
WSL Area Spring -27.28∗∗∗ -26.78∗∗∗ -26.44∗∗∗ -26.73∗∗∗ -23.09∗∗∗
(0.97) (1.11) (0.95) (1.10) (0.81)
Summer -66.19∗∗∗ -64.89∗∗∗ -63.92∗∗∗ -64.80∗∗∗ -58.48∗∗∗
(1.99) (2.32) (1.95) (2.30) (1.75)
Fall -43.85∗∗∗ -42.62∗∗∗ -41.76∗∗∗ -42.54∗∗∗ -36.70∗∗∗
(1.45) (1.69) (1.42) (1.68) (1.24)
Winter -12.20∗∗∗ -11.89∗∗∗ -11.56∗∗∗ -11.87∗∗∗ -9.69∗∗∗
(0.62) (0.72) (0.61) (0.72) (0.54)
Random Control Group Yes No No No No
No Control Group No Yes No No No
Matched Control No No Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic Trend No No No Yes No
Include τ = −1 No No No No Yes
R2 Spring 0.137 0.195 0.122 0.122 0.115
Summer 0.277 0.376 0.246 0.246 0.236
Fall 0.194 0.268 0.173 0.174 0.165
Winter 0.075 0.105 0.071 0.071 0.069
Households 52,571 26,285 52,571 52,571 52,571
Observations Spring 590,040 303,269 632,272 632,272 658,443
Summer 588,903 302,304 630,033 630,033 655,983
Fall 596,345 305,046 635,775 635,775 661,792
Winter 598,444 305,606 637,165 637,165 663,143
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Models 1-3 attenuate slightly in a consistent manner for all seasons as the control group
changes. If our preferred specification, Model 3, is taken as the most reliable estimator,
Model 1 overestimates the water savings of WSL by between three and five percent. Model
2 overstates water savings by an even smaller margin of one to three percent, suggesting that
eventual WSL homes provide an effective control group for those that have already selected
into the program.
Model 4 additionally includes a linear and quadratic time trend for the treated group only,
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based on the same matched sample used in Model 3. This model investigates the possibility,
noted within the event study, that differential post-treatment trends between the control
and treatment groups may influence our estimates.12 These results are effectively unchanged
from Model 3, showing that despite the small post-treatment decline in our control group
shown in Fig. 4 our estimates are not driven by a significant differential time trend.
Model 5 addresses the finding from the event study of declines in water conservation
among WSL adopters up to three years prior to confirmation of WSL installation, and our
choice to exclude τ = −1 from the preferred specification. To assess the ramifications of
this phenomenon, we estimate Model 3 but include observations from the year before WSL
adoption (τ = −1) for both treatment and control groups. The result is an eleven percent
decrease in the estimated annual water savings from WSL. The total annual savings for this
model are 392 gallons/m2 (SE = 7.83). We believe the gap between landscape conversion
and approval is substantial enough to justify the exclusion of τ = −1 from the preferred
model because this gap suggests that is it likely that many of the water savings that accrue
between τ = −2 and −1 are likely the result of pre-approval landscape conversions. Model
5 therefore provides a lower bound on WSL-induced water savings.
In the event study, we also noted that the pre-treatment decline appears to begin be-
tween years −3 and −2, so we also test a specification in which both τ = −1 and −2 are
excluded from the population (not shown). In this specification, we find that estimated
water savings increase by about four percent compared to Model 3. This likely represents an
overly optimistic estimate of the true WSL induced savings, and may be attributing other
water conserving behavior that significantly pre-dates the landscape conversion to the WSL
program.
Utilizing Model 3, we find that the seasonal pattern of WSL savings is consistent with
expectations and the seasonal pattern of consumption across all models (see Fig. 3). Even
in winter, the estimated water savings are non-trivial, roughly 18 percent of summer conser-
12Models utilizing linear trends and higher-degree polynomials generated very similar results.
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vation levels. This suggests that there is substantial outdoor water consumption even in the
winter in this environment. In Model 3, our preferred specification, total savings cumulate
to 438 gallons/m2 (SE=8.86) annually.
This is in comparison to the estimates generated by Sovocool et al. (2006) of about 600
gallons per m2 annually, with 103 gal/m2 in July and 16.8 gal/m2 in December. Even our
upper bound estimates lie well below those of Sovocool et al.
6.3 Durability and Cohort Effects
The results for the durability regression estimated from Eq. 3 show a very modest attrition
(one to two percent of seasonal water savings per annum) in the spring summer, and winter,
and slight annual increase in the fall. The total annual decline in WSL induced savings sums
to 1.94 gallons per m2 per year (SE = 0.94), which is significant at the 5% level. Taken at
face value, these results imply an annual reduction in the original water savings from WSL
of 4.4 percent over ten years.
However, given the structural correlation between WSL age and the timing of landscape
conversion due to our time limited dataset, the potential for attrition of water savings over
time must be assessed while also controlling for the effect of WSL cohort. When separately
controlling for the effects of cohort and landscape age as in Eq. 4, the magnitude and
significance of the rebound effect grows even smaller. Annually, there is a reduction in
effectiveness of 1.76 gallons per m2 per year (SE = 0.92), which is not significant at the 5%
level.
Contrary to the finding of positive rebound effects in many studies of energy conservation
investments, these analyses show no compelling evidence for a long-run rebound effect of
WSL for water conservation in Las Vegas. The results of an alternate specification, in which
the effect of the age of the WSL landscape is allowed to vary by year (rather than conforming
to a linear slope), are shown in Fig. 6 and provide a less parametric confirmation of this
finding.
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Figure 6: Regression results showing the relationship between the age of a WSL conversion and
the water savings generated.
Fig. 6 suggests a simple explanation for the difference between the “Rebound” and
the “Rebound x Cohort” results; later adopters of WSL (who by construction have many
young landscapes in our sample) appear to have conserved slightly less water per unit area
upon conversion than early adopters, although the differences are small, inconsistent across
seasons, and insignificant.
6.4 Economic Performance
We consider the economic performance in terms of its cost effectiveness - how much water
was conserved per dollar of public investment? We also consider the private economic gains,
in terms of reduced water bills, to homeowners.
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Table 3: Average gallons saved per dollar spent on rebate if we assume that the rebate
expenses are annualized over a period of 5, 10, 20 or 40 years and WSL induced water
savings last the same number of years. The Annual row shows the the year round average
monthly water savings for each monthly dollar spent on rebates, computed as the weighted
average of the four seasonal estimates.
Repayment Period
5 years 10 years 20 years 40 years
Payment Spring -133.65∗∗∗ -252.59∗∗∗ -452.64∗∗∗ -736.57∗∗∗
(4.52) (8.54) (15.30) (24.89)
Summer -320.40∗∗∗ -605.55∗∗∗ -1,085.15∗∗∗ -1,765.85∗∗∗
(9.26) (17.51) (31.38) (51.06)
Fall -206.67∗∗∗ -390.59∗∗∗ -699.95∗∗∗ -1,139.02∗∗∗
(6.79) (12.84) (23.01) (37.44)
Winter -56.94∗∗∗ -107.61∗∗∗ -192.83∗∗∗ -313.79∗∗∗
(2.88) (5.45) (9.76) (15.89)
Annual -182.50∗∗∗ -344.91∗∗∗ -618.09∗∗∗ -1,005.81∗∗∗
(3.51) (6.63) (11.88) (19.34)
R2 Spring 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.120
Summer 0.242 0.242 0.242 0.242
Fall 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171
Winter 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071
Households 52,571 52,571 52,571 52,571
Observations Spring 632,272 632,272 632,272 632,272
Summer 630,033 630,033 630,033 630,033
Fall 635,775 635,775 635,775 635,775
Winter 637,165 637,165 637,165 637,165
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
6.4.1 Cost Effectiveness
Season-specific estimates of the monthly gallons of water conserved per year-2000 dollar, β
from Eq. 5, are shown in Tab. 3. These estimates measure the average flow of water savings
secured by the annuitized subsidy payment implied by the lump-sum subsidies to homeowners
- the monthly water savings associated with an additional monthly dollar spent on WSL
rebates. The estimates in different rows reflect different assumptions about the number of
years of additional water savings provided by WSL, where the horizon for calculating the
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annuitized subsidy payment is matched to this interval. The final row of Tab. 3 presents
the annual average gal/$ estimated from a weighted sum of the four seasonal β estimates.
The water savings per dollar vary significantly depending on assumptions about the
horizon of the public investment. Under the relatively conservative assumption that WSL
secured 10 years of water savings on a typical property, we find that for every dollar spent
on the WSL program, about 345 gallons of water are saved at a cost of $2.90/kgal. In
comparison, if WSL secured 20 years of additional water savings, then the water savings
increases to 618 gal/$ ($1.62/kgal). These values straddle the retail pricing of water of
about $2.23/kgal.13
Table 4: Average gallons saved per dollar spent on rebates assuming that WSL savings last
10 years, by cohort group. The base payment coefficient can be interpreted as the water
savings for WSL conversions at age 0 in the fourth and most recent cohort.
Spring Summer Fall Winter
Payment -233.9∗∗∗ -548.3∗∗∗ -345.5∗∗∗ -104.6∗∗∗
(9.04) (18.7) (13.3) (7.00)
Cohort 1 × Payment -530.1∗∗∗ -1467.9∗∗∗ -753.7∗∗∗ -259.8∗
(82.1) (169.4) (168.6) (103.4)
Cohort 2 × Payment -63.1∗∗∗ -168.8∗∗∗ -126.1∗∗∗ -36.7∗∗∗
(13.7) (23.9) (22.4) (10.8)
Cohort 3 × Payment 20.8 31.9 33.0 19.3∗
(11.4) (23.3) (17.8) (9.09)
Age × Payment 2.15 2.37 -1.29 2.94∗∗
(1.12) (2.05) (1.69) (0.90)
R2 0.121 0.245 0.173 0.071
Households 52,571 52,571 52,571 52,571
Observations 632,272 630,033 635,775 637,165
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The results estimated from Eq. 6 are shown in Tab. 4. Fig. 7 shows results from an
alternate specification, where the total annual gallons of water saved per dollar invested
are allowed to vary with each enrollment year instead of with the cohort group. Both
specifications tell a consistent story; the early cohorts, particularly Cohort 1, were more
13This is the average price per thousand gallons paid by all consumers in the sample across all years.
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cost effective than later cohorts, largely because of the generally escalating pattern of WSL
subsidies with time, but also because of the slightly greater water savings per area for the
earliest cohorts. Cohort 3, with the highest rebate value, was the least cost effective, with
about 13 percent less water saved per dollar than the most recent cohort over the course of
a year (although this difference is not statistically distinguishable). Overall, these results
suggest that cost effectiveness of the program has generally been stable after the initial
phase. Finally, Tab. 4 shows that the previous finding that WSL-driven water conservation
is durable is mirrored for cost-effectiveness as well.
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Figure 7: Gallons of Water saved per rebate dollar invested by the year in which the WSL landscape
conversion was completed.
6.4.2 Private Benefits
The results of the regression described in Eq. 7 are shown in Tab. 5. The final column shows
the total annual savings estimated from a weighted sum of the four seasonal regressions.
We find an annual water bill savings of 79¢ per m2 of turf converted under WSL. Given
a typical landscape conversion cost of $15/m2 (Sovocool et al., 2006; SNWA, 2014), this
gives an unsubsidized and undiscounted repayment period of nineteen years. We do not
consider the potential benefits homeowners may accrue from reduced costs (in dollars and
time) to maintain a xeric landscape in comparison to a mesic landscape, which may reduce
the repayment period. This demonstrates that the private savings on individual’s water
bills from turf removal were likely inadequate to have functioned as a strong inducement
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for homeowners to have undertaken these changes without explicit subsidization or large
increases in the retail price of water. This judgement is apart from any utility gained from
xeric landscaping itself; however, evidence from similar real estate markets (Klaiber et al., in
press) suggests that xeric landscapes capitalize negatively relative to green yards, where this
finding is net of any cost savings from xeric landscaping being capitalized into home prices.
This reinforces the assessment that few homeowners would have undertaken turf removal
without WSL subsidies.
Table 5: This table shows the estimated private monthly savings (in year 2000 cents) for
each square meter of turf converted to xeric landscaping under the WSL program.
Spring Summer Fall Winter Annual
WSL Area -4.53∗∗∗ -12.0∗∗∗ -7.64∗∗∗ -1.67∗∗∗ -79.02∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.54) (0.36) (0.14) (2.39)
R2 0.032 0.069 0.037 0.020
Households 52,571 52,571 52,571 52,571
Observations 632,272 630,033 635,775 637,165
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Median (average) WSL conversion areas are approximately 90 m2 (125 m2), so the median
(average) annual reductions to the water bill are about $71 ($99). While small relative to
the cost of financing a landscape conversion, these savings are nonetheless about 24 percent
of the annual pre-conversion water bill for the typical WSL participant.
7 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS
Our DID analysis provides robust evidence that households that accepted WSL subsidies to
modify their water-intensive landscaping saw substantial reductions in water use compared
to households that did not take advantage of the subsidies (ATTWSL). As noted in Section
5.2 there are ample reasons to expect that this estimate is approximately the same as a DID
comparison between households taking on WSL-style landscape transformations and those
that do not (ATTWSL ≈ ATT INSTALL). WSL subsidies were substantial and the WSL
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program was aggressively promoted such that awareness of the program was widespread by
the mid-2000s. These factors, combined with the finding in Section 6.4.2 that the land-
scaping changes mandated under WSL were unattractive as private investments, suggests
that few households in our non-WSL control group engaged in significant turf removal and
replacement without utilizing the subsidy.
A critical question for policy makers is the additionality of the WSL subsidy. If all large
scale landscape conversions are directly driven by the policy itself then the entire estimated
average water savings of the program can be attributed to the subsidy: ATT INSTALL =
ATT SUBSIDY . On the other hand, if the WSL-treated households would have removed turf
from their landscapes at a higher rate than the control group in the absence of the subsidy,
then ATTWSL will overstate subsidy-driven water savings (Bennear et al., 2013). There are
several arguments suggesting a high degree of additionality for the WSL program. First,
the private benefit-cost analysis for turf removal is unattractive in the absence of substantial
preferences for water conservation or desert landscaping. Second, unlike many other durable
goods such as refrigerators, air conditioners, or toilets (Davis et al., 2014; Bennear et al.,
2013) there is no clear upper bound on the useful life of landscaping. Individual plants
may require maintenance or replacement, but there is no natural replacement horizon for
the landscape itself. Therefore, compared to many other subsidies for the replacement of
durable goods, there is little reason to suspect that WSL-rewarded landscape renovations
would have occurred in the absence of the subsidy.14
The water savings from WSL were significant, yielding reductions in annual water use of
about 18 percent (48,600 gallons) for the average participant. While sizable, these reductions
are smaller than estimates from an earlier pilot study (Sovocool et al., 2006), which estimate
96,000 gallon annual savings for the average participant. There are many potential causes for
14It is possible that some households that had already planned to undertake a major renovation of their
landscaping were induced by the WSL subsidy to install a more water-conserving landscape than they would
have otherwise chosen. Our DID estimates may overstate the additionality of WSL for these households if
their counterfactual landscapes would have already been more water-saving than landscape changes in the
control group. We have no data on the potential size of this segment or their landscaping preferences.
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this gap. The Sovocool et al. study utilizes data from a pilot study that largely predates the
period of the mainstreaming of WSL that we study. A combination of selection toward water-
conscious early adopters and potentially more attentive calibration of irrigation equipment
in the pilot period may have lead to optimistic estimates of water savings compared to under
full-scale implementation.15 The Sovocool et al. study directly measures water application
for outdoor irrigation through use of submeters. This is clearly the ideal choice to estimate
changes in outdoor water consumption, but would miss any potential offsetting behaviors if
residents begin to use more water indoors, for example by taking longer showers, responding
less urgently to leaks and running toilets, or running their dishwashers or washing machines
more often. These manifestations of the rebound effect (Gillingham et al., 2013) could
have appeared relatively quickly in response to lower water bills. Our analysis considers
the household water use as a whole, and therefore subtracts any offsetting effects from our
initial estimate of WSL-induced water savings. Finally, it is possible that WSL indirectly
induced complementary water-hungry landscape investments on the part of homeowners. For
example, a homeowner may chosse to overhaul their landscaping by bundling turf removal
and xeric landscaping with a new pool or water feature. The availability of WSL subsidies
may have induced (or shifted forward) such bundled conversions by lowering the overall cost
of the remodel. Furthermore, there may be benefits in terms of lowered costs and reduced
logistical headaches from taking on these landscape investments simultaneously. However,
the presence of a downward bias requires that WSL-adopters undertake these water-intensive
investments at a greater rate than their neighbors in the control group. Unfortunately, the
assessor data, which does not provide longitudinal information on pool and water feature
installation, is incapable of assessing the magnitude of these effects.
While much of the water savings accrued in the warm spring and summer months, we find
15Landscape installers may have an incentive to calibrate irrigation equipment to water more heavily than
necessary in the long run to ensure the establishment of the new landscape. Inattentive homeowners may
subsequently fail to adjust the watering level to an appropriate maintenance level. Landscape maintenance
companies may also have an incentive to aggressively water xeric landscapes in order to ensure that their
customers (who face relatively low water prices and may be inattentive to outdoor water use) are satisfied
with their services.
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that WSL conserved water across the entire year. This was driven in part by the relatively
arid conditions that persist in Las Vegas year-round as well as by the common landscaping
practice of overseeding Bermuda grass - a heat-tolerant species that goes dormant in the
winter - with annual ryegrass in the fall and winter months. Indeed, the much larger water
savings in fall compared to spring (Table 2) likely comes from avoiding the multiple waterings
per day required to germinate and establish a winter ryegrass lawn.
We find little evidence of an erosion of water savings from turf removal. This persistence
has multiple potential explanations. First, most xeriscaped landscapes are watered using
automated timers; once these systems are calibrated (in many cases by hired landscapers)
many homeowners may have a tendency to ignore the outdoor watering until a major event
(e.g., a broken irrigation pipe, an excessively high water bill, or dying plants) occurs. Second,
unlike many household appliances, where greater energy or water efficiency may directly
induce more intensive use of the appliance over time due to the lower cost of its services (i.e.,
turning down the thermostat on a more efficient air conditioner), there may not be a similar
intensive margin for households to exploit with respect to their landscaping. Watering more
intensively need not produce additional landscape services. While there may have been
significant rebound effects from WSL (see above), we expect that these developed over a
short horizon after the new landscape was installed so that the initial water savings of WSL
were durable after the first year of installation.
The cost-effectiveness of WSL depends critically upon the assumed horizon of the public
investment - the average length of time until a WSL-like landscape would have occurred on
treated parcels in the absence of the program. This assumption is difficult to substantiate
given the lack of a natural replacement horizon for landscaping. However, an investment
horizon of at least 20 years seems reasonable given the durability of landscape features. In
this case 1000 gallons can be conserved for $1.62 ($0.99 if water savings are accrued over 40
years).
By comparison, the average annual water bill for a Las Vegas residential customer ranged
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between $325 and $395 during the study period, giving an overall average retail price of
$2.23/kgal. The lowest marginal price charged for water - which is likely substantially below
the marginal cost of supply - has declined from $0.98 and $0.89 during the study period,
while the highest has increased from $2.27 to $3.56 (nominally $4.58) over the same period.
To the extent that the average retail price approximates the marginal cost of pumping,
treating and delivering water from existing supplies (primarily from Lake Mead), it suggests
that the cost of reducing water use through WSL is less than the costs of supplying that
same amount of water to customers.16
Given the scarcity and insecurity of Las Vegas’ Colorado River allocation and the drought
that strongly shaped Las Vegas’ water policy in the 2000s, it arguable that a much more
relevant comparison to the costs of water savings through WSL is the marginal cost of
augmenting supplies. However, for the short to medium-term horizon for which WSL was
designed, Las Vegas had (and continues to have) few means to augment its supply aside from
water conservation. While some western cities have been able to expand their water supplies
through purchasing agricultural water rights, Las Vegas has not been able to do so in recent
decades due to a combination of limited surface-watered agriculture in southern Nevada,
political and infrastructure barriers to transfers within-state, and institutional barriers to
interstate transfers. With very limited surface water available locally, Las Vegas has looked
to regional groundwater sources to augment supply. In 1989, Las Vegas began applying for
water permits to access groundwater from more northern parts of the state, especially the
Snake Valley Aquifer, which underlies which both Nevada and Utah. A multi-billion dollar
pipeline was planned to move the water to Las Vegas. These efforts have faced substantial
opposition from ranchers and rural residents of the areas in both Nevada and Utah, and
despite nearly three decades of effort and litigation, construction still has not yet started
(Hall & Cavataro, 2013; Gehrke, 2013; Longson, 2011; Jenkins, 2009; Green, 2008). Indeed,
a widely-used database of water transfers in the western US from 1987 to 2009 reports no
16This comparison does not account for any marginal administrative costs associated with WSL.
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purchases of water rights by the City of Las Vegas or the Las Vegas Valley Water District
in the period of our study (Donohew & Libecap, 2017). Therefore, while we lack a concrete
estimate of the cost of augmenting supply to Las Vegas, it seems clear that options for
obtaining water at any price are highly uncertain, and would certainly be substantially
larger than the prices charged to retail customers.
Given the prohibitively high cost of augmenting supply in the near-term, the relevant
economic context for a budget-constrained Las Vegas policy maker is how the publically
borne cost of a quantity of water conservation through WSL compares to other means of
saving water.17 Throughout the 2000s Las Vegas pursued a multipronged policy of water
conservation. In addition to stringent restrictions on turf in new construction and other
construction incentives and regulations, programs targeted at existing residents including
the enhanced enforcement for outdoor water waste, coupons for pool covers, rain sensors,
and other irrigation systems, restrictions on the use of water features, retrofit packages for
indoor fixtures in single family homes, and an award-winning publicity campaign to promote
water conservation outdoors (SNWA, 2009, 2014).
In a recent analysis of water policies in Albuquerque, NM Price, Chermak, and Felardo
(2014) estimate that cost-effectiveness of utility rebates ranged from $0.39/kgal for low-flow
showerheads, $1/kgal for dishwashers and washing machines, and over $8.00/kgal for the
replacement of low-flow toilets.18,19 However, these calculations rely upon a common but
strong assumption - that all subsidized appliance replacement is additional. Yet, there are
longstanding concerns that many participants in water- and energy-efficiency programs are
17A full social benefit-cost analysis would need to include the direct costs of landscape conversion borne
by homeowners, potentially offset by lower maintenance costs, as a cost of the program. Furthermore, the
costs of the subsidy, while relevant to the utility, represents a transfer from the water utility to homeowners
and is therefore not a social cost.
18Costs of water savings in this and other papers we report utilize a variety of, often unspecified, assump-
tions on the use of nominal vs. real prices, discount rates, and the method used to attribute water savings
to program costs. We do not attempt to resolve these differences; therefore comparisons should be made
cautiously.
19They also find that a xeriscape rebate program cost $4.51/kgal. The greater cost-effectiveness of the
Las Vegas program may have been driven in large part by the greater potential year-round water savings
from turf removal in Las Vegas relative to Albuquerque.
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free riders that would have undertaken the desired behavior in the absence of the subsidy
(Joskow & Marron, 1992). Bennear et al. (2013) utilize data from Cary, NC to estimate
that over 67 percent of the water savings associated with high-efficiency toilet rebates would
have occurred without the rebates, increasing the cost of water savings to $10.85/kgal if
the lifespan of existing toilets was 15 years. Boomhower and Davis (2014) estimate that
approximately half of individuals purchasing new energy-efficient refrigerators and appliances
under a Mexican subsidy program were non-additional. This suggests that subsidies for
replacement of appliances and fixtures may be considerably less cost-effective than commonly
presumed.
An alternative approach to pecuniary incentives is to utilize informational campaigns
and nudges rooted in pro-social norms to alter household behavior directly. This approach
is now being mainstreamed through customer engagement programs for utilities such as
WaterSmart Software and Opower. Ferraro and Price (2013) demonstrated that programs
that go beyond information provision by comparing individuals’ water use to their neighbors’
can be highly cost-effective, reducing water use by nearly 5 percent at a cost of $0.58/kgal.
However, the ability of these behavioral interventions to provide sustained water savings
remains controversial. Ferraro and Price (2013) found that effects attenuate quickly, yet in a
follow-up study Bernedo, Ferraro, and Price (2014) report that effects remain policy-relevant
six years later - reducing costs of water conservation to $0.24/kgal. Allcott and Rogers (2014)
suggest that repeated exposure to socially framed information provision on energy use may
slow the rate of backsliding - yielding long-run conservation effects that decay relatively
slowly. Indeed, while Las Vegas did not engage in targeted behavioral nudges, they did
nonetheless utilize mail and television marketing to promote drought awareness and water
conservation behaviors. Brelsford and Abbott (2017) provide suggestive evidence that these
efforts may have played a substantial role in explaining the large reductions in Las Vegas’
per-capita water use in the mid-2000s.
Examining the wide range of cost-effectiveness estimates suggests that WSL compares
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favorably to many rebate programs, yet perhaps less so compared to informational/nudge-
based programs. While our estimates suggest that WSL has not fully lived up to the the
optimistic water savings and cost-effectiveness calculations of early pilot studies (Sovocool
et al., 2006), it nevertheless has a number of attractive characteristics that have made it a
vital part of Las Vegas’ water policy toolbox. Its effects on individual water conservation
have been demonstrably large (approximate 18% on average), while, at its best, norm-based
messaging reduces water use by 5%. Reducing outdoor water use was especially important
given that much of the water used outdoors does not return to Lake Mead and cannot be
credited against Las Vegas’ allocation of the Colorado River through return flow credits. As
a result, WSL provided a cost-effective pathway to permanently augment Las Vegas’ water
supply through water conservation at a time when the city was beset by a severe drought and
when alternative sources of supply were not readily available. Whether similar landscape
subsidy programs would be as attractive in other jurisdictions is unclear; Las Vegas’ highly
arid climate may enhance the cost-effectiveness of WSL relative to other subsidy programs.
Nevertheless, our results suggest that subsidies for turf removal may be a promising way for
budget-constrained utilities facing high costs of tapping new supplies to effectively enhance
their existing supply by building future water efficiency into the urban landscape.
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